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INTRODUCTION 
 
HE idea that the large business corporation is characterized by 
“separation of ownership and control” will forever be identified with 
Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means’ The Modern Corporation & Private 
Property.1  The idea itself was not theirs.  Already in The Wealth of Nations, 
Adam Smith wrote about business firm managers of “other people’s money” 
who would be unlikely to manage it with the “same anxious vigilance” shown 
by the active partners in a smaller firm.2  For the modern business 
corporation in the United States, the idea was well established in Thorstein 
Veblen’s Absentee Ownership in the 1920s.3  Nevertheless, Berle and Means’ 
much more approachable and graphic formulation brought the idea of 
separation of ownership and control into public discourse and, according to 
TIME Magazine, made their book the “economic Bible” of the Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Administration.4
 
                                                                                                                          
1.  ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION & PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1932) [hereinafter The Modern Corporation].  For more information on Berle, see 
JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A. BERLE AND THE VISION OF AN AMERICAN 
ERA (1987); Richard S. Kirkendall, A. A. Berle, Jr.: Student of the Corporation, 1917–1932, 
35 BUS. HIST. REV. 43 (1961).  For more information on Means, see WARREN J. SAMUELS 
& STEVEN G. MEDEMA, GARDINER C. MEANS, INSTITUTIONALIST AND POST KEYNESIAN 
(1990).  On the writing of The Modern Corporation, see Thomas K. McCraw, In Retrospect: 
Berle and Means, 18 REV. AM. HIST. 578 (1990). 
  The Modern Corporation and particularly Berle 
himself significantly influenced New Deal policymaking, including the passage 
2.  ADAM SMITH, V AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS, at 326 (Oxford Univ. Press 1880) (1776).  Speaking of directors of joint stock 
companies, Smith continued: 
 Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to 
small matters as not for their master’s honour, and very easily give 
themselves a dispensation from having it.  Negligence and profusion, 
therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of 
the affairs of such a company. 
Id.  Smith then opined that, in foreign trade at least, joint stock companies would seldom 
be able to compete effectively with “private adventurers.”  Id. 
3.  THORSTEIN VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN RECENT 
TIMES: THE CASE OF AMERICA (1923).  On this book’s unfortunate history, see Rosalind 
Schulman, Absentee Ownership Reread, 21 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 319 (1962).  On numerous 
other writers who had commented on the problem during the two decades prior to The 
Modern Corporation, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–
1937, at 349–65 (1991); Forest G. Hill, Veblen, Berle and the Modern Corporation, 26 AM. J. 
ECON. & SOC. 279 (1976). 
4.  Robert Hessen, The Modern Corporation and Private Property: A Reappraisal, 26 J.L. & ECON. 
273, 279 (1983) (quoting TRANSPORTATION: Credit Manager, TIME, Apr. 24, 1933, at 
14). 
T 
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of the Securities Act of 19335 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.6
The Modern Corporation remains a critically important historical artifact in 
the law of corporations and the history of the New Deal.  It is widely cited to 
this day, although probably negatively as often as positively.
 
7
But the separation of ownership and control is hardly a distinctively 
institutionalist notion.  It was embraced equally by marginalist Neoclassicists 
long prior to the publication of The Modern Corporation.  The important 
difference was attitude.  Not only for Classicists like Adam Smith, but also for 
Veblen, Berle and Means, and New Deal Institutionalists generally, the 
separation of ownership and control was a serious economic and social 
problem, explaining why corporations did not act in either the interests of 
their shareholders or the public interest. 
  The book is 
arguably the most enduring legacy of pre-war institutionalist economics.  
Institutionalism, with its historical and fact-intensive approach to economics, 
its reliance on evolutionary theories, and its distrust of markets, became the 
dominant economic philosophy of both the New Deal and the Legal Realists.  
To some degree at least, the book has suffered the same fate as 
Institutionalism generally—it is frequently castigated by Neoclassicists for 
being excessively descriptive and unscientific, and lauded by more left-leaning 
dissenters. 
In sharp contrast, Neoclassicists embraced the separation of ownership 
and control as a fundamental principle of efficient firm behavior.  The 
principal fields of microeconomics that are external to the firm, namely price 
theory and industrial organization, treat the firm largely as a black box whose 
only goal is maximization of value.  To the extent shareholder preferences 
differ from this goal, they almost never show up.  For example, within price 
theory a firm sets its output or price by equating marginal cost and marginal 
revenue, not by consulting shareholders.  Indeed, in the neoclassical model of 
markets, separation of ownership and control has become a virtual 
prerequisite to productive management and risk taking.8
While Berle and Means claimed the rhetoric of “separation of ownership 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
5.  Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
77a–77aa) (2006)).  
6.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm (2006)). 
7.  See, e.g., George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, The Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle and 
Means, 26 J.L. & ECON. 237 (1983). 
8.  See generally, e.g., MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL 
ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. 
Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983). 
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and control,” their economic analysis suffered the same fate as institutionalist 
economic analysis generally.  Institutionalism was overly historical and 
preoccupied with detail, much too descriptive, and inherently suspicious of 
the phenomena it was examining.  Most importantly, Institutionalism was 
unable to devise useful theory with predictive power.  The Institutionalists 
certainly had a point when they insisted that economics cannot be separated 
from social science, history, and even evolutionary biology.  But in the 
process of attempting to incorporate everything, they gave up too much of 
the elegance that Neoclassicism’s much simpler forward-looking models 
produced.9
The principal technical differences between the Institutionalists and the 
Neoclassicists lay in two things.  First was the importance of Marginalism as a 
theory of economic choice.  Second were the two schools’ profound 
differences concerning utility measurement and the scientific possibility of 
interpersonal utility comparisons. 
  Like other institutionalist writings, The Modern Corporation was 
heavily historical and drawn to largely descriptive accounts of the dispersion 
of corporate ownership, as well as anecdotes about corporate power and its 
abuse.  The empirical studies in the book pertained to the concept of 
separation of ownership and control.  They were generally irrelevant to the 
conclusions that Berle and Means drew about managerial irresponsibility.  By 
contrast, within neoclassical economics, including law and economics, 
separation of ownership and control has become an essential part of the 
analysis of the business firm and its financial structure.  In addition, 
separation is fundamental to our assumptions about the markets in which 
firms operate. 
On the first, Neoclassicism started with quantitative rules that purported 
to account for individual choice when resources are scarce.  Under this view, 
 
                                                                                                                          
9.  Institutionalism’s modern stepchild is the much more technical New Institutional 
Economics, which combines neoclassical methodologies, including its mathematics, with 
an increased appreciation of institutions and a positive research agenda.  See Oliver E. 
Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, 38 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 595 (2000).  See also Kenneth J. Arrow, Reflections on the Essays, in ARROW AND 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC POLICY 727, 727–34 (George R. 
Feiwel ed., 1987) (contrasting the old and new institutional economics and giving a similar 
explanation about why the old Institutionalism failed).  For an overview of new 
Institutionalism, see generally HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (Claude 
Ménard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2005); EIRIK G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, 
INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (1997); THRÁINN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND 
INSTITUTIONS (1990). 
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economic actors equate their utilities at the margin, continuously preferring 
things with highest incremental utility.  Further, preferences were thought to 
be “rational” in the sense that they are transitive,10
By contrast, Institutionalists at least since Thorstein Veblen were deeply 
suspicious of Marginalism’s professed ability to explain all elements of 
economic behavior.
 and “revealed” in the sense 
that they are exercised through the making of observable choices, particularly 
in markets.  This collection of observations led to a rather complete theory of 
prices, production, and demand and satisfaction. 
11  Veblen found Marginalism to be both reductionist and 
counterfactual.  It was reductionist because it purported to account for both 
demand and production from an entirely static picture of the economy, with 
no sense of movement.12  It was counterfactual because it did not seem to 
account for the complex ways that people and firms actually behave.13
When basic models for the social sciences were being formed, 
Marginalists at the turn of the century were continuously criticized for 
adopting a narrow view of humanity that did not take biological evolution 
into account.
 
14  For example, Veblen criticized marginalist economics for not 
being an “evolutionary” science.15
 
                                                                                                                          
10.  That is, if an actor prefers A over B and B over C, she must also prefer A over C. 
  Marginalist economics stripped humanity 
down to a set of utility functions that equated human behavior with desire 
and completely ignored inherited characteristics.  To be sure, the theory of 
evolution was just as reductionist, recasting desire as nothing more than the 
instinct to survive.  But the two models developed very different mechanisms 
for determining appropriate social policy.  The differences showed up most 
starkly in theories about controlling deviant behavior and criminality.  
Marginalists would control crime by creating financial disincentives or limiting 
liberty, acting on the premise that human beings are autonomous actors who 
respond by degrees to various amounts of pain and pleasure.  By contrast, 
11.  See Thorstein Veblen, The Limitations of Marginal Utility, 17 J. POL. ECON. 620 (1909). 
12.  Id. at 621. 
13.  Id. at 621–22. 
14.  See GEOFFREY M. HODGSON, THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: AGENCY, 
STRUCTURE AND DARWINISM IN AMERICAN INSTITUTIONALISM 325–28 (2004); WARREN J. 
SAMUELS, THE LEGAL-ECONOMIC NEXUS: FUNDAMENTAL PROCESSES 258–59 (2007).  On 
institutional economics, see James R. Stanfield, The Scope, Method and Significance of Original 
Institutional Economics, 33 J. ECON. ISSUES 231 (1999). 
15.  Thorstein Veblen, Why is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science?, 12 Q.J. ECON. 373 (1898).  
Legal realist Walton Hamilton echoed the criticisms a generation later.  See Walton H. 
Hamilton, The Institutional Approach to Economic Theory, 9 AM. ECON. REV. 309 (1919). 
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Darwinians would control criminal behavior by identifying those “types” that 
were thought to be prone to it, and then using sterilization or other means to 
ensure that they could not reproduce their kind.  What is often unappreciated 
today is the extent to which both models guided Progressive Era 
policymaking.16
The second important difference between the Neoclassicists and the 
Institutionalists lay in the value they placed on the measurement of utility and 
the scientific possibility of interpersonal utility comparisons.
 
17  Until the early 
1930s, marginalist writers generally worked from the premise that all human 
beings had utility functions that were more or less the same—or at least that 
economists could work from that assumption.  As a result they could 
conclude that involuntary as well as voluntary transfers increased welfare.  To 
illustrate: suppose Peter has more carrots than he needs and fewer peas.  This 
is another way of saying that the marginal value, or utility, of the last carrot 
that Peter owns is less to him than the marginal value of the last pea.  He 
would prefer to substitute carrots for peas to the point that the marginal value 
of the two were the same, giving him the optimal mixture.  Suppose that Mary 
has fewer carrots than she needs and an excess of peas.  She would also prefer 
to equate her utilities, which she could do by substituting in the opposite 
direction—more carrots for fewer peas.  At that point, all economists, 
whether classical, neoclassical, or institutionalist, would agree that a voluntary 
exchange would be productive.  By exchanging some carrots and peas with 
one another both Peter and Mary could arrive at points that gave them greater 
utility than did their starting point.  That transaction would be a Pareto 
improvement: both Peter and Mary would be better off.18
The problem occurred in situations that suggested the possibility of 
increased utility from an involuntary transfer.  Suppose that Peter had an excess 
of carrots and the right amount of peas, while Mary had the right amount of 
peas but a shortage of carrots.  Neoclassicists prior to the 1930s generally 
assumed that welfare, or utility, would be increased if someone simply forced 
Peter to give some of his carrots to Mary.  After all, he had more than he 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
16.  See Herbert Hovenkamp, Insanity and Criminal Responsibility in Progressive America, 57 N.D. L. 
REV. 541, 561–66 (1981); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 
64 TEX. L. REV. 645 (1985); MARK HALLER, EUGENICS: HEREDITARIAN ATTITUDES IN 
AMERICAN THOUGHT (New Brunswick 1984) (1963); DONALD PICKENS, EUGENICS AND 
THE PROGRESSIVES (1966). 
17.   See Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law and Economics Movement, 42 STAN. L. REV. 993, 
1013–30 (1990). 
18.  For information about Pareto Improvement allocations, see, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW AND 
STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 112–13 n.68 (2002). 
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needed, so the marginal value he placed on the excess must be quite low; she 
had fewer than she needed, so the marginal value she placed on them would 
be high.  A forcible transfer would then move the carrots from a lower to a 
high-value use.  The influential marginalist economists at Cambridge 
University in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, including Alfred 
Marshall, Arthur Cecil Pigou, and Joan Robinson, all accepted some version 
of this proposition.19
Followed to its logical conclusion, this result led to socialism.  The notion 
that people had similar utility functions that could be compared from one 
person to another indicated that welfare would be increased if wealth was 
transferred away from people who had more than they needed for basic 
wants, and toward people who were poor.  The marginal value of a dollar to a 
rich person must be much less than its marginal value to someone who needs 
it for her next meal. 
 
An unresolved problem, however, was whether people’s utility functions 
really are in fact similar.  Writing in the 1930s, during the heyday of scientific 
Positivism and Verificationism, Lionel Robbins from the London School of 
Economics powerfully rejected the proposition that such comparisons were 
even meaningful.  The Cambridge economists had simply assumed without 
question that people have identical utility functions, but in fact there is no 
empirical test one can perform in order to verify or falsify that proposition: 
 
[S]uppose that we differed about the satisfaction derived 
by A from an income of £1000, and the satisfaction derived 
by B from an income of twice that magnitude.  Asking them 
would provide no solution.  Supposing they differed. [sic] A 
might urge that he had more satisfaction than B at the 
margin.  While B might urge that, on the contrary, he had 
more satisfaction than A.  We do not need to be slavish 
behaviourists to realise that here is no scientific evidence.  
There is no means of testing the magnitude of A’s satisfaction as 
compared with B’s.  If we tested the state of their blood-
streams, that would be a test of blood, not satisfaction.  
Introspection does not enable A to measure what is going on 
 
                                                                                                                          
19.  See Hovenkamp, supra note 17, at 1001; Robert Cooter & Peter Rappoport, Were the 
Ordinalists Wrong About Welfare Economics?, 22 J. ECON. LITERATURE 507, 513–20 (1984).  
On Pigou in particular, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Coase Theorem and Arthur Cecil Pigou, 
51 ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id= 1275987.  
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in B’s mind, nor B to measure what is going on in A’s.  
There is no way of comparing the satisfactions of different 
people.20
 
 
With that decisive statement, “Ordinalism,” or the idea that interpersonal 
comparisons of utility are impossible, entered the mainstream of neoclassical 
economics and has for the most part been there ever since.  Voluntary 
exchange requires no such comparison because each trader needs to know 
only her own utilities.  For instance, Peter knows that, given what he already 
has, he values peas more than carrots; Mary concludes the opposite.  Each 
makes the exchange without caring too much about how the other’s wants are 
satisfied.  But one cannot say the same thing about the involuntary transfer: 
some outside observer would have to conclude that the world would be 
better off if Peter had fewer carrots and Mary had more. 
While this discussion may seem irrelevant to the issue of corporate 
ownership and control, it is in fact central to understanding the way that this 
concept was developed within Neoclassicism.  Shareholders are human beings 
with utility functions.  Within the neoclassical framework, corporations are 
economic actors who have profit functions.  For them, the term “utility 
function,” as ascribed to human preferences, is meaningless insofar as it 
purports to describe anything other than profits measured in a constant unit, 
such as dollars.  In the wake of the ordinalist revolution, welfare economics 
and business economics, or price theory, acquired rather different focuses.  
Welfare economics became focused mainly on questions of general welfare, 
Pareto efficiency, social choice, and the derivation of a social welfare function 
under the constraints of Ordinalism. 
By contrast, business economics largely lost its concern with utility, apart 
from observed individual purchasing behavior.  Rather, it became 
preoccupied with the behavior of markets under competitive or less 
competitive conditions.  The relevant medium of trade became currency 
(dollars), and dollars-as-dollars are both quantifiable and comparable as they 
are transferred from one actor to another.  Within this model, the goal of the 
system is maximization of wealth and the concept of utility is largely ignored 
or assumed to be similar to wealth.  Firms have “profit” functions, and the 
 
                                                                                                                          
20.  LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE 
139–41 (2d ed. 1937).  On the influence of Positivism on the first Ordinalists, see 
WILLIAM H. BEVERIDGE, THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND ITS PROBLEMS, 
1919–1937 at 46–58 (1960). 
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global assumption within Neoclassicism is that a firm acts rationally when it 
maximizes profits.  Any distinctive concept of “utility maximization” of a 
business firm is entirely meaningless. 
Further, the concept of profit maximization is indifferent to the identity 
and distribution of either shareholders or managers.  The entire thrust of 
neoclassical corporate finance theory was to turn the shareholder into nothing 
more than an investor, who was presumed to have no interest other than the 
maximization of firm value, ignoring what his or her actual interest might be.  
The manager became nothing more than the agent of profit-maximizing 
decision making.  Until the rise of agency cost models during the 1960s, 
Neoclassicism largely disregarded the ownership/control problem by positing 
that both the firm and its shareholders had only profit maximization in 
mind.21
Of course, this does not change the fact that, at bottom, all shareholders 
are natural biological persons,
 
22
As this Article develops in subsequent sections, the rational behavior of a 
business firm—within the neoclassical model—has nothing to do with the 
preferences of shareholders to the extent that they prefer things that are any 
different from the maximization of firm value or profits.  This conception of 
the relationship between shareholders (ownership) and managers (control) 
has been remarkably robust in neoclassical theory since the beginning of the 
twentieth century and has manifested itself in several ways, including: 
 each with a set of desires and values that may 
include things other than profit maximization.  Under the constraints of 
Ordinalism, we cannot scientifically quantify what these utility functions are, 
but neither can we say with certainty that anything that maximizes the value 
or profits of a firm necessarily maximizes the utility of its shareholders.  This 
is hardly a problem for the neoclassical economics of the firm.  It either 
ignores the separate utility preferences of shareholders, or assumes that the 
shareholders’ collective utility function is identical to the corporation’s profit 
function. 
 
• Yale economist Irving Fisher’s “separation theorem” and its 
offspring, which showed that the profit goals of the business 
 
                                                                                                                          
21.  See Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 
375, 387 (1983).  See also Stigler & Friedland, supra note 7, at 240. 
22.  Some corporate shares are owned by other corporations, but ultimately a natural person, 
or perhaps in a few instances the government, owns the shares. 
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firm were completely separable from the utility functions of 
its diverse shareholders;23
• Coase’s pioneering article, The Nature of the Firm, which 
showed that all of a firm’s production decisions, including 
those regarding its size and the extent of its integration into 
other markets, are entirely a consequence of a comparison of 
the marginal value of internal production against that of 
market transactions;
 
24
• The various corporate finance theorems of the 1950s, 
including the Modigliani-Miller theorem and later the 
efficient capital market hypothesis, which served to further 
disaggregate shareholders from the firm’s financial structure 
by treating debt and equity (ownership) as fungible, and the 
distribution between them as irrelevant to the firm’s value or 
its production decisions;
 
25
• Inefficiencies resulting from interest conflicts between 
management and shareholders were generally treated as a 
problem of agency costs, which are transaction or 
monitoring costs that are internal to the firm. 
 
 
On the final point, neoclassical theory also recognized, in the guise of 
agency costs, that firms might make inefficient choices or have suboptimal 
financial structures.  While a transaction cost is a cost of using a market, or 
producing an exchange between two independent actors, an agency cost is a 
cost of making a decision within the firm.26
 
                                                                                                                          
23.  See infra notes 
  While Neoclassicism saw nothing 
inherently inefficient in the separation of ownership and control, 
inefficiencies resulting from such separation would be characterized as agency 
27–30 and accompanying text. 
24.  Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).  See also infra notes 27–30 
and accompanying text. 
25.  See infra notes 27–30 and accompanying text. 
26.  See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308–09 (1976) (discussing the 
classic treatment of agency costs).  For a good, brief explication of the relationship 
between transaction costs in markets (separate economic actors) and agency costs within 
the firm, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 408, 416–17 (Aspen 
Publishers 6th ed. 2003).  See also Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, 
Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 777–788 (1972); 
Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative 
Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1651 (2006).  
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costs.  One important characteristic of the great theorems of corporate 
finance, such as Fisher’s separation theorem or the Modigliani-Miller 
theorem, is that they worked in financial markets that were presumed to be 
perfectly competitive and without agency costs.  As a result, observers could 
identify problems with possible legal solutions by inquiring into situations 
where these costs were positive.27  Soon after, the concept of agency costs 
came to perform the same role within the firm that transaction costs 
performed in the market—determining where legal policy could make a 
difference and then assigning legal entitlements in such a way so as to ensure 
wealth-maximizing outcomes.28
 
 
I. FISHER’S SEPARATION THEOREM 
 
Already in the first decade of the twentieth century, the brilliant Yale 
Neoclassicist Irving Fisher developed the early details of what was to become 
his “separation theorem.”29
If that is the case, however, then the firm’s profit function cannot be 
shown to be a consequence of the shareholders’ collective utility function.  
This is intuitively obvious, particularly when we take the ordinalist revolution 
into account.  If shareholder utility functions are unknowable, they certainly 
cannot be equated with firm profit-maximization functions, which are a 
relatively simple matter of deciding on the course of action that produces the 
most profit. 
  Fisher’s analysis began with the notion that 
shareholders and firms are different.  Shareholders, like all natural persons, set 
out to maximize their utility.  They have “consumption” functions, which 
simply represent a list of desires, limited resources, and a set of values for 
prioritizing them.  Firms, in contrast, set out to make profits.  Indeed, a 
fundamental premise of both classical and neoclassical economics is that 
profit maximization is the goal of the firm. 
 
                                                                                                                          
27.  See Douglass C. North, Comment on Stigler and Friedland: “The Literature of Economics: The Case 
of Berle and Means,” 26 J.L. & ECON. 269, 270 (1983) (arguing that Berle and Means 
addressed the problem of agency costs within the corporation long before anyone else 
did, and noting that Coase’s The Nature of the Firm was not published until five years later). 
28.  The Coase theorem operates to like effect in markets.  See Ronald Coase, The Problem of 
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 6 (1960). 
29.  Fisher developed the fundamental theory in IRVING FISHER, THE NATURE OF CAPITAL 
AND INCOME (1906) and in IRVING FISHER, THE RATE OF INTEREST (1907), but he 
presented the mature theorem in IRVING FISHER, THE THEORY OF INTEREST AS 
DETERMINED BY IMPATIENCE TO SPEND INCOME AND OPPORTUNITY TO INVEST IT 
(Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1970) (1930). 
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Fisher assumed that shareholders have utility preferences that are 
incapable of being specified, but nevertheless appear in individual 
consumption decisions.  He then showed that in an efficient market for 
capital, a business firm will choose value maximization as a strategy regardless 
of shareholders’ utility preferences for dividends or reinvestment, or their 
preferences regarding how profits should be spent.  Simply put, Fisher 
separation theorem states that, given perfect and complete capital markets, 
the production decision is governed solely by the profit-maximization 
objective.  The production decision is separate from the consumption 
decision, which is governed solely by utility maximization.30
Once it has accepted this formulation of the issue, the neoclassical theory 
of the business firm might make any of these assumptions: (1) that the firm 
has an aggregate “utility function” composed of the utility functions of its 
shareholders; (2) that the shareholders’ utility is achieved solely by the profit 
maximization of the firm, or that any act undertaken by the firm toward 
profit maximization has the unanimous consent of the shareholders; or (3) 
that the firm should stop caring about what the shareholders’ utility function 
is and consider itself a unitary profit-maximizing entity. 
 
Neoclassical theories of the firm, of corporate finance, and even of price 
theory have adopted some version of assumptions (2) or (3), consistent with 
Fisher’s analysis.  Neoclassicists who feel obliged to rationalize the complete 
separation of ownership and control in widely-held corporations might simply 
assume that shareholders want to maximize their corporation’s value.  
Perhaps they note that shares are held in large part by retirement funds, 
mutual funds, and other instruments for which maximization of value is the 
articulated goal.  But for the most part, the formal theory of corporate finance 
pays very little attention to the actual preferences of shareholders insofar as 
they might desire the corporation to do something other than maximize its 
market value.  In short, the theory assumed as a matter of technique that 
shareholders were unanimous in wanting value maximization.  Until the rise 
of agency cost models after 1960, Neoclassicism largely disregarded the 
ownership/control problem by positing that both the firm and its 
shareholders had only profit maximization in mind.31
During the 1970s in particular, corporate finance theory was quite beset 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
30.  For a moderately technical explanation of Irving Fisher’s theorem, see Irving Fisher’s Theory 
of Investment, http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/essays/capital/fisherinvest.htm.  See also 
RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 22 (McGraw-Hill 
Irwin 9th ed. 2007). 
31.  See Demsetz, supra note 21.  See also Stigler & Friedland, supra note 7, at 240.  
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by this assumption of shareholder unanimity that seemed inherent in the 
neoclassical theory of the firm.  By and large, this literature did not sample 
actual shareholder preferences to see if they were truly unanimous.  Rather, it 
simply assumed that all shareholders were profit maximizers, although they 
might have had different attitudes about risk.32
 
  But for the most part, in 
corporate finance theory, the distinctive preferences of shareholders are 
simply ignored.  That which maximizes the value of the firm is all but 
conclusively presumed to be what the shareholders prefer, and that is the end 
of the matter.  Indeed, actual polling of shareholder preferences on most 
production and finance decisions becomes a costly, frustrating waste of time 
and resources.  As Eugene Fama and Merton Miller said in the 1970s: 
Where there exist organized capital markets in which shares 
can be freely bought and sold and where these markets are 
perfect . . . it is possible to develop an objective, operational 
decision criterion for management that (1) does not involve 
stockholder utility functions directly but (2) leads to precisely 
the same investment and operating decisions that each 
stockholder would make if he were running the firm 
himself.33
 
 
The basic logic of Fisher’s separation theorem was that the goal of the 
firm is always to maximize overall returns, thus giving the shareholders the 
ideal opportunity to spend the profits as they please.34
 
                                                                                                                          
32.  The literature, much of which was quite technical in its use of mathematics, includes 
Steinar Ekern & Robert Wilson, On the Theory of the Firm in an Economy with Incomplete 
Markets, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 171 (1974); Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, Stockholder Unanimity in Making Production and Financial Decisions, 94 Q.J. ECON. 543 
(1980); Oliver D. Hart, On Shareholder Unanimity in Large Stock Market Economies, 47 
ECONOMETRICA 1057 (1979); Hayne E. Leland, Information, Managerial Choice and Stockholder 
Unanimity, 45 REV. ECON. STUD. 527 (1977); Louis Makowski, Competition and Unanimity 
Revisited, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 329 (1983); Robert C. Merton & Marti Subrahmanyam, The 
Optimality of a Competitive Stock Market, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 145 (1974); Roy 
Radner, A Note on Unanimity of Stockholders’ Preferences among Alternative Production Plans: A 
Reformulation of the Ekern-Wilson Model, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 181 (1974); Mark 
Rubinstein, Competition and Approximation, 9 BELL J. ECON. 280 (1978). 
  Today, Fisher’s 
33.  EUGENE F. FAMA & MERTON H. MILLER, THE THEORY OF FINANCE 69 (1972).  For an 
enthusiastic embrace of separation of ownership and control as permitting specialized 
decision making and reducing agency costs, see Fama & Jensen, supra note 8, at 301.  
34.  See Remus D. Valsan & Moin A. Yahya, Shareholders, Creditors, and Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: 
A Law and Finance Approach, 2 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 1, 35–36 (2007). 
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separation theorem is regarded as a building block for the more general 
Modigliani-Miller theorem of corporate finance.  This theorem, developed in 
the 1950s, states that in an efficient market for capital, a firm’s value is not a 
function of the way it is financed (i.e., its ratio of debt to equity).  In this 
model, the number, identity, or interests of shareholders become entirely 
irrelevant when the conditions of the theorem are satisfied.35
Assumptions such as Fisher’s separation theorem became particularly 
important in the analysis of highly competitive markets, where profit-
maximizing behavior is an essential prerequisite to firm profitability.  That is, 
the more competitive the market in which a firm operates, the more 
important it becomes to ignore the divergent wishes of shareholders.
  Of course, this 
model, like all neoclassical models, is severely reductionist.  It assumes that 
profit is the only thing that shareholders want.  To the extent an individual 
shareholder believes the firm should be pursuing some goal inconsistent with 
profit maximization, his or her wishes are simply ignored. 
36
Ironically, this view stated the Berle and Means concern somewhat 
backwards.  For them, separation of ownership and control was a problem of 
bigness and, at least to a degree, of monopoly.  But in fact, substantial market 
power creates more tolerance for firm discretion than does competition.  In 
other words, for the widely-held firm in a highly competitive market, 
separation of ownership and control becomes a matter of survival. 
 
 
II. VALUE MAXIMIZATION AND THE NATURE OF THE FIRM 
 
Following Fisher, the next great statement of the neoclassical business 
firm was Ronald Coase’s The Nature of the Firm, which was published in 1937 
while Coase was still at the London School of Economics.37
 
                                                                                                                          
35.  See supra notes 
  Coase simply 
assumed what Fisher had labored to prove.  While Coase’s article discussed 
decision making in several large, widely-held American firms, it never so 
much as mentioned the diverse desires of shareholders.  Coase began with the 
premise that the firm invariably seeks to maximize its profit, and queries how 
its managers will decide the size of the firm and the number of markets in 
29–30 and accompanying text.  See also Demsetz, supra note 21, at 375 
(explaining that corporate performance does not depend on identity or configuration of 
shareholders); Harold Demsetz & Belen Villalonga, Ownership Structure and Corporate 
Performance, 7 J. CORP. FIN. 209, 210 (2001) (stating that shareholders will eventually adopt 
the ownership form that maximizes returns). 
36.  On this point, see Fama & Jensen, supra note 8. 
37.  Coase, supra note 24, at 404. 
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which it will operate.  Perhaps the best thesis statement of The Nature of the 
Firm is the one that Coase himself gave a half century later: 
 
Whether a transaction would be organized within the firm 
. . . [ or integrated] or whether it would be carried out on the 
market by independent contractors depended on a 
comparison of the costs of carrying out these market 
transactions with the costs of carrying out these transactions 
within an organization, the firm.38
 
 
In making any production or distribution decision, from whether to 
switch suppliers, or not to use a supplier at all, a firm relentlessly and 
continuously compares costs and payoffs, always taking the course that is 
most profitable.  The Coasian firm never consults shareholders except insofar 
as one of them might have some information or expertise to offer.  If the 
shoe manufacturer considers whether to continue purchasing laces from an 
independent supplier or to integrate vertically into lace production by building 
its own lace factory, it simply compares the costs and benefits of each 
alternative.  Importantly, these decisions are not simply “operational,” they 
are also “structural.”  The aggregation of all of these decisions establishes 
how large the firm is “horizontally,” how many different products it 
produces, and also how large it is “vertically,” in the sense that it integrates 
different steps in the manufacturing and distribution process.39
Coase has repeatedly professed that The Nature of the Firm was based on 
hard empirical work in the field.
 
40  To be sure, he does not claim that his 
article was based on quantitative methods.41  Rather, Coase claims that he 
formulated his ideas by examining the details of how production decisions are 
made in real life firms.42
 
                                                                                                                          
38.  Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Origin, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 3, 17 (1988). 
  Throughout his career Coase wrote with irritation 
about armchair economists who think of economics in terms of “markets” or 
39.  See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Law of Vertical Integration and the Neoclassical Business Firm: 
1880–1960, 95 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1268328. 
40.  See e.g., Coase, supra note 38. 
41.  To the contrary, in speaking of his enlightening visit to a Ford Motor plant he observed 
that people were more willing to talk to him because “I do not want statistics.  All I want 
are statements that are suggestive from the point of view of fitting into a theory of 
integration.”  Coase, supra note 38, at 14.  
42.   Coase, supra note 38. 
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“functions,” concepts that are abstracted from reality.43  Much of Coase’s 
work, particularly The Problem of Social Cost, has been made the subject of 
empirical studies.44  Further, in his 1991 Nobel Prize lecture he railed at 
economists whose principal work consisted of a set of abstractions.45
 
                                                                                                                          
43.  See Ronald H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. ECON. 357, 357–60, 372–76 
(1974).  In 1997 Coase said: 
 
I don’t reject any policy without considering what its results are.  If 
someone says there’s going to be regulation, I don’t say that regulation will 
be bad . . . . What we discover is that most regulation does produce, or has 
produced in recent times, a worse result.  But I wouldn’t like to say that all 
regulation would have this effect because one can think of circumstances 
in which it doesn’t . . . . Almost all the studies—perhaps all the studies—
suggested that the results of regulation had been bad, that the prices were 
higher, that the product was worse adapted to the needs of consumers, 
than it otherwise would have been.  I was not willing to accept the view 
that all regulation was bound to produce these results.  Therefore, what 
was my explanation for the results we had?  I argued that the most 
probable explanation was that the government now operates on such a 
massive scale that it had reached the stage of what economists call 
negative marginal returns.  Anything additional it does, it messes up. 
Thomas W. Hazlett, Looking for Results: Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase on Rights, Resources, and 
Regulation, REASON, Jan. 1997, at 40, available at http://www.reason.com/ 
news/printer/30115.html. 
44.  See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES (1991); Glenn W. Harrison et al., Coasian Solutions to the Externality Problem in 
Experimental Markets, 97 ECON. J. 388 (1987); Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, 
Experimental Tests of the Coase Theorem with Large Bargaining Groups, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 149 
(1986); Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental 
Tests, 25 J.L. & ECON. 73 (1982).  See also George J. Stigler, Two Notes on the Coase Theorem, 
99 YALE L.J. 631, 631 (1989) (defining the Coase theorem as saying that prices in two 
areas subject to trade “will differ by no more than the cost of movement of the goods 
between the markets.”).  On the empirical testing of mathematical propositions, see 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Marginal Utility and the Coase Theorem, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 783, 788–
97 (1990); Steven G. Medema & Richard O. Zerbe, The Coase Theorem, in 1 THE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECON. 836, 864–73 (Gerrit de Geest & Boudewijn Boukaert 
eds., Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 2000).  
45.  Ronald H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, in ECONOMIC SCIENCES 1991–
1995, at 12–13 (Torsten Persson ed. 1997).  There, Coase stated:  
This neglect of other aspects of the system has been made easier by 
another feature of modern economic theory–the growing abstraction of 
the analysis, which does not seem to call for a detailed knowledge of the 
actual economic system or, at any rate, has managed to proceed without it.  
Holmstrom and Tirole, writing on The Theory of the Firm in the recently 
published Handbook of Industrial Organization, conclude at the end of their 
article of 63 pages that “the evidence/theory ratio . . . is currently very low 
in this field.”  Peltzman has written a scathing review of the Handbook in 
which he points out how much of the discussion in it is theory without 
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Notwithstanding these protests, The Nature of the Firm is an exercise in 
pure theory.  As Coase wrote: 
 
It is hoped to show in the following paper that a definition 
of a firm may be obtained which is not only realistic in that it 
corresponds to what is meant by a firm in the real world, but 
is tractable by two of the most powerful instruments of 
economic analysis developed by Marshall, the idea of the 
margin and that of substitution, together giving the idea of 
substitution at the margin.46
 
 
Why does a firm producing an undifferentiated product in competition 
commit its resources to producing a second product, instead of continuously 
producing more and more of the original product?  Coase’s answer was that 
“there may be a point where it is less costly to organise the exchange 
transactions of a new product than to organise further exchange transactions 
of the old product.”47
                                                                                                                          
any empirical basis.  What is studied is a system which lives in the minds 
of economists but not on earth.  I have called the result “blackboard 
economics.”  The firm and the market appear by name but they lack any 
substance.  The firm in mainstream economic theory has often been 
described as a “black box.”  And so it is.  This is very extraordinary given 
that most resources in a modern economic system are employed within 
firms, with how these resources are used dependent on administrative 
decisions and not directly on the operation of a market.  Consequently, the 
efficiency of the economic system depends to a very considerable extent 
on how these organisations conduct their affairs, particularly, of course, 
the modern corporation.  Even more surprising, given their interest in the 
pricing system, is the neglect of the market or more specifically the 
institutional arrangements which govern the process of exchange.  As 
these institutional arrangements determine to a large extent what is 
produced, what we have is a very incomplete theory. 
  Given that both markets and internal production have 
costs, a firm maximizes its profits by choosing among the most profitable 
46.  Coase, supra note 24, at 386–87. 
47.  Id. at 402.  In The Nature of the Firm, Coase used “marketing costs” to describe what would 
later be characterized as transaction costs: “To determine the size of the firm, we have to 
consider the marketing costs (that is, the costs of using the price mechanism) . . . .”  Id. at 
403.  See also id. at 405 (describing how the businessman combines the functions of 
“initiative,” which refers to use of the market, and “management,” which refers to 
supervision of internal production, and that the combination is the result of “marketing 
costs”).  Fifty years later, when recalling the writing of The Nature of the Firm, Coase spoke 
of the same costs as transaction costs: “The solution [to the problem of understanding 
why firms integrate vertically rather than purchasing] was to realize that there were costs 
of making transactions in a market economy and that it was necessary to incorporate 
them into the analysis.”  See Coase, supra note 38.  
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alternatives, continuously comparing the marginal costs and returns of doing 
something “in-house” against the costs and returns of purchasing from or 
selling to someone else. 
To be sure, Coase made several observations to the effect that purchasers 
in companies are continuously searching for the best deal.48  He also 
expanded this to include the idea that a firm might decide to manufacture 
one’s own shoe laces when the market conditions for purchasing them are 
too unfavorable.  But this is largely common sense and common knowledge, 
and certainly does not establish the elegant theory of production choice that 
Coase developed in The Nature of the Firm.  The theory underlying Coase’s 
brilliant paper is no more empirical than the observations of the early 
Marginalists such as Jevons and Marshall, that individuals have declining 
marginal utility and equate their utilities at the margin.49
Toward the end of his article Coase queried to himself and his readers 
whether his concept of the firm “fits in with that existing in the real world.”
  One might observe 
that the home shopper who has three dozen eggs in the refrigerator but no 
milk will go to the store to purchase milk and not eggs.  But that observation 
tells us little about the theory that consumers equate their utilities at the 
margin. 
50  
He did so, not by looking at firms, but rather by examining the legal 
relationship of master and servant.  After quoting a lengthy definition from an 
English jurist, Francis Raleigh Batt,51 Coase concluded that what the 
employee (servant) and agent (buyer or reseller) had in common was not the 
presence of a fixed wage or commission, but rather the degree of freedom 
that an agent could exercise.52
 
  Coase concluded: 
When we are considering how large a firm will be the 
principle of marginalism works smoothly.  The question 
 
                                                                                                                          
48.  See Coase, supra note 38, at 8–10, 13 (recounting a visit to the United States prior to 
writing The Nature of the Firm, where he visited the purchasing department at a Union 
Carbide plant and listened to telephone conversations that “gave [him] a lively sense of 
the possibilities of substitution”; also recounting discussions at General Motors about the 
acquisition of Fisher Body works, its former trading partner, and being told that it was to 
ensure that Fisher’s plant would remain located close to GM). 
49.  See ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLE OF ECONOMICS bk. 3, ch. 1, § 1 (Macmillan & Co. 
1890); WILLIAM S. JEVONS, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY ch. 3, § 13 (Macmillan 
& Co. 1871). 
50.  Coase, supra note 24, at 403. 
51.  Id. (quoting FRANCIS RALEIGH BATT, LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 6 (4th ed. 1950)). 
52.  Id. at 404 (quoting BATT, supra note 51, at 7). 
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always is, will it pay to bring an extra exchange transaction 
under the organising authority?  At the margin, the costs of 
organising within the firm will be equal either to the costs of 
organising in another firm or to the costs involved in leaving 
the transaction to be “organised” by the price mechanism.  
Business men will be constantly experimenting, controlling 
more or less, and in this way, equilibrium will be 
maintained.53
 
 
The Nature of the Firm did for firm structure what Fisher’s separation 
theorem had suggested for firm finance: it turned the firm into an engine 
whose only goal was the pursuit of profits, which it achieved by continuously 
comparing the marginal costs and benefits of doing things in different ways.  
The result was a “moving equilibrium,” within which managers made 
continuous decisions about how and what to produce, and how and what to 
purchase.  At the margin, internal and external costs are equalized.  
Significantly, however, this was a set of purely technical problems, resolved 
for the manager by experience and the economist, by price theory and 
industrial organization.  To the extent they might differ, the independent 
wishes of shareholders had no place. 
 
III. THE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND VALUE OF THE 
CORPORATION 
 
The earliest neoclassical theorems in corporate finance, such as Irving 
Fisher’s separation theorem, assumed that capital markets were efficient.54  In 
fact, the roots of the modern efficient capital market hypothesis were 
developed in neoclassical marginalism early on.  As the early Marginalists 
observed in the late nineteenth century, people tend to equate their utilities.55  
They purchase a good until the marginal utility of that good declines to the 
level they experience for some other good.56
 
                                                                                                                          
53.  Coase, supra note 
  The corollary in finance is that 
people equate their returns.  Stocks become investment vehicles whose prices 
are calculated to produce the same level of return, once adjusted for risk. 
24, at 404. 
54.  See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.  
55.  See Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law and Economics Movement, 42 STAN. L. REV. 993, 
1001 (1990); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Marginalist Revolution in Legal Thought, 46 VAND. L. 
REV. 305, 309–15 (1993). 
56.  See, e.g., FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 62–66 (1921). 
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One important difference between classical and neoclassical value theory 
lay in the treatment of risk and uncertainty.  Because Classicists measured 
value by looking at past averages, the theory did not explicitly incorporate the 
risk of uncertain future events.  Things such as the value of labor or the value 
of a business firm were measured by reference to previous investment; risk of 
future events did not formally fit into the theory.  To be sure, business 
persons investing in the nineteenth century certainly took anticipated risks 
into account, but the classical value model did not account for them.57
Before modern corporate finance theory could emerge, several things had 
to be worked out.  First, Marginalism had to develop a robust theory of 
competition because of its forward-looking nature, and because it was a 
theory in which information, risk, and uncertainty acquired heightened 
importance.
  In 
very sharp contrast, Marginalism’s criteria of willingness-to-pay, or expected 
value, almost always involved a certain amount of uncertainty.  For longer-run 
investments or less stable markets the uncertainty could be considerable.  
Determining how to accommodate uncertainty about the future into 
economic modeling proved to be a central problem of neoclassical economics 
in the first half of the twentieth century. 
58  Second, this theory had to be applied to the corporate equity 
market.  The theory, coupled with a set of empirical studies of commodity 
and stock market behavior, led to the formulation of the efficient capital 
market hypothesis.59
Marginalist economics initially created a great deal of doubt about the 
competitiveness and even the robustness of markets.  Also, many of the 
earliest Marginalists abandoned the commitment to free markets that was 
explicit in classical political economy.  Some even toyed with socialism as an 
alternative to free markets.
 
60  Prominent Neoclassicists backtracked 
considerably from the classical hostility, toward economic regulation.61
 
                                                                                                                          
57.  Herbert Hovenkamp, The Marginalist Revolution in Corporate Finance: 1880–1965, at 42 (Univ. 
of Iowa Legal Stud. Research Paper No. 08-29, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1141291. 
  Major 
58.  See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Neoclassical Crisis in U.S. Competition Policy, 1890–1955, 94 
MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract _id=1156927&rec=1&srcabs=988381.   
59.  See infra notes 70–88 and accompanying text. 
60.  See John W. Mason, Political Economy and the Response to Socialism in Britain, 1870–1914, 23 
HIST. J. 565, 567–69 (1980). 
61.  See WILLIAM S. JEVONS, THE STATE IN RELATION TO LABOUR 1–21 (MacMillan & Co. 
1882).  See also HENRY SIDGWICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 518–44 
(MacMillan & Co. 1887) (criticizing the laissez-faire position of the Classicists).  On the 
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technical controversies within neoclassical economics served to create 
significant doubts about the efficiency of markets.62
Gradually, Neoclassicism was able to formulate the details of a more or 
less robust model of competition, even though the domain of so-called 
“perfect competition” within Marginalism was never as broad as the 
strenuous competition that Classicists believed prevailed in nearly every 
market.  The Neoclassicists had to deal with numerous complexities that the 
marginalist model contemplated, such as increasing returns to scale, which 
gave larger firms a cost advantage over smaller ones.
 
63  Marginalism also led 
to theories of imperfect competition and product differentiation, both of 
which made marginal cost pricing unworkable.64
 
  In addition, marginalist 
corporate finance theory had to work out some important problems regarding 
the relationship between a business firm’s market incentives, its selection of 
capital sources, and the potentially separate incentives of its stockholders.  
The Fisher separation theorem discussed above was an important first step; 
the great corporate finance theorems of the mid-twentieth century were 
another. 
A. Modigliani-Miller: The Fungibility of Ownership and Debt 
 
Today, Irving Fisher’s separation theorem is regarded as a building block 
for the more general Modigliani-Miller theorem of corporate finance.  
Developed in the 1950s, the theorem states that in an efficient market for 
capital, a firm’s value is not a function of the way it is financed (i.e., its ratio 
of debt to equity).  In this model, the number, identity, and interests of 
shareholders become irrelevant to the firm’s financial decisions when the 
conditions of the theorem are satisfied.65
In the traditional law and theory of business firms, ownership and debt 
 
                                                                                                                          
attitudes of early Marginalists toward wealth distribution, see Robert Cooter & Peter 
Rappoport, Were the Ordinalists Wrong about Welfare Economics?, 22 J. ECON. LITERATURE 
507, 513–14 (1984). 
62.  See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937 chs. 22–25 
(1991).  See also, e.g., EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC 
COMPETITION (1933); JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 
(1933).  
63.  See Henry C. Adams, Relation of the State to Industrial Action, 1 PUBLICATIONS OF THE 
AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION 7, 52, 59–64 (Am. Econ. Ass’n 1887) (arguing that 
industries subject to significant scale economies must be regulated by the government); 
Hovenkamp, supra note 58, at 15–16.  See also HOVENKAMP, supra note 62, at ch. 23. 
64.  See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 62, at ch. 5. 
65.  Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory 
of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261, 264 (1958). 
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were regarded as two very distinctive things.  If the firm was a corporation, 
ownership was a set of property rights in the form of stock, and owners made 
the operational decisions.  By contrast, debt was contractual and gave 
creditors a right to collect periodic interest payments and eventually reclaim 
their principal.  But ordinarily, debt gave them no say in the firm’s operations.  
A business firm commonly has both owners and creditors and also has 
considerable control over its debt-to-equity ratio.  For example, if a firm is 
thinking of building a new plant, it might finance the project by issuing 
additional shares (ownership) or by borrowing money. 
Under traditional notions of corporate finance, a firm could reduce its 
cost of capital and thus increase its value by taking on debt.  Typically, debt is 
cheaper because the rate of return on bonds is lower than the returns to 
capital, reflecting the lower risk of bonds.  However, if a firm borrows too 
much—that is, if it becomes excessively leveraged—then risk begins to rise, 
and both stockholders and bondholders will demand higher returns, causing 
the cost of capital to rise again.  As a result, under traditional corporate 
finance theory, the cost of capital falls as the corporation takes on more debt, 
bottoms out at a certain point, but rises again as the amount of debt is 
regarded as excessive.  One important way of maximizing the firm’s value by 
reducing its cost of capital is to find the optimal debt-to-equity ratio.  
Traditionally, both too little and too much debt were regarded as costly. 
The Modigliani-Miller theorem was named after its developers.  Franco 
Modigliani was an Italian-born Jewish economist who fled Europe during the 
Italian Fascist purge.  He eventually settled in the United States and made his 
career primarily at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  Merton Miller 
was an American economist who spent most of his senior career at the 
University of Chicago.  The Modigliani-Miller theorem was worked out in a 
series of articles written in the late 1950s and early 1960s.66  The theorem 
states that in a perfectly functioning market for capital, debt and equity are 
completely fungible.  As a result, it does not matter what proportion of debt 
to equity a firm has; its value is determined entirely by its stream of earnings 
in the markets where it operates.67
 
                                                                                                                          
66.  Id. at 295–96 (1958); Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, Dividend Policy, Growth, and the 
Valuation of Shares, 34 J. BUS. 411 (1961) (establishing that payment of dividends has no 
effect on valuation of a firm); Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, Corporate Income 
Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A Correction, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 433 (1963).  See also Franco 
Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Modigliani-Miller Propositions After Thirty Years, 2 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 99 (1988). 
 
67.  See FRANCO MODIGLIANI, 3 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF FRANCO MODIGLIANI, at xiii (A. 
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Modigliani and Miller reasoned that in a perfectly functioning capital 
market, all participants would be able to optimize.  For example, suppose 
there are two firms, Xequity and Xmix, which are identical in every way 
except that Xequity’s entire capital comes from stock ownership, while 
Xmix’s capital is based 60% on equity and 40% on debt.  How much would a 
prospective owner be willing to pay for each of these firms?  The traditional 
answer was that Xmix would be worth either more or less than Xequity 
depending on how close it was to the optimal debt-to-equity ratio. 
By contrast, the Modigliani-Miller analysis showed that, where their 
assumptions were met, the value of the two firms would be precisely the 
same.  This is because, in a perfectly functioning capital market, participants 
could make their own offsetting debt-to-equity substitutions.  For example, an 
investor could purchase the debt-free firm but borrow 40% of the money, 
leaving herself in a debt-equity position precisely equal to that of the 
leveraged firm’s position.  As a result, if one firm was priced more highly than 
the other, the investor would take the cheaper one without regard to the debt-
to-equity ratio.  Any time the market tended to value one of the two firms 
higher than the other based simply on its debt-to-equity ratio, rational 
investors would borrow a complementary amount of money, purchase the 
cheaper option, and trade the value back to the equilibrium point.  In 
equilibrium the investor would face the same risk for any mix of stock and 
equity.  As a result, equity-to-debt would have no impact on the value of the 
firm.  Under this concept, stock ownership, or equity, becomes nothing more 
than one of two completely interchangeable ways of providing capital to the 
firm. 
The theorem applies only to perfectly competitive financial markets 
without transaction costs.  As a result, it comes with the same caveats as the 
Coase theorem.  That is, although theorizing a world of perfect, costless 
                                                                                                                          
Abel ed., 1980), stating the following as the basic theorem: 
 [W]ith well-functioning markets (and neutral taxes) and rational 
investors, who can “undo” the corporate financial structure by 
holding positive or negative amounts of debt, the market value of the 
firm—debt plus equity—depends only on the income stream 
generated by its assets. It follows, in particular, that the value of a 
firm should not be affected by the share of debt in its financial 
structure or by what will be done with the returns—paid out as 
dividends or reinvested (profitably). 
See also Demsetz, supra note 21, at 386 (arguing that corporate performance does not 
depend on identity or configuration of shareholders); Demsetz & Villalonga, supra note 
35, at 211–12 (demonstrating that shareholders will eventually adopt the ownership for 
maximizing returns); Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A 
Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779 (2006). 
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capital markets is informative, corporate finance policy choices must be 
considered in the context of the real world, where transaction costs are never 
free.  For example, to the extent that debt receives tax treatment that is more 
favorable than the treatment given to dividends, the impact will be to shift 
firms more toward debt.  This could result in excessive leverage and fixed 
interest cost commitments that cannot be paid in the event of a financial 
downturn. 
The Modigliani-Miller theorem can also be seen as a specific application 
of Coase’s idea in The Nature of the Firm—that a firm’s managers will always 
choose the more profitable course of operation.68  Modigliani-Miller extends 
this observation to choices about the firm’s financial structure.  In the 
absence of transaction or agency costs, the value of the firm is invariant to the 
way that it is financed—either by increasing ownership through equity or by 
increasing borrowing through debt.  The corollary is that in the presence of 
such costs, the firm will select the more profitable alternative.  As a result, the 
firm’s choice about whether to issue more shares or take on more debt is 
driven entirely by the presence of frictions in the system, such as taxes, 
agency problems, other internal inefficiencies, or imperfect information, but 
not by any notion that the firm is inherently more valuable under one or 
another form of organization.69
 
  Further, its choice of a debt-to-equity ratio is 
entirely independent of the individual wishes of shareholders. 
B. Competition and Equity Markets: The Efficient Capital Market 
Hypothesis 
 
As the modern neoclassical model of perfect competition developed 
through the first half of the twentieth century, the role of information became 
increasingly important.  Perfect competition depended on markets with a 
fairly large number of buyers and sellers, a lack of significant scale economies, 
and the free flow of information.  In 1921, University of Chicago economist 
Frank Knight identified costless flow of information as a precondition to 
effective competition in his important book Risk, Uncertainty and Profit.70
 
                                                                                                                          
68.  See supra notes 
  In 
addition, Knight introduced the concepts of risk and certainty as inherent in 
Marginalism’s emphasis on reasonable expectations.  For Knight, “risk” 
45–48 and accompanying text. 
69.  MARK RUBINSTEIN, A HISTORY OF THE THEORY OF INVESTMENTS: MY ANNOTATED 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 138–39 (2006). 
70.  KNIGHT, supra note 56, at 78–87. 
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referred to future variations whose probabilities were knowable.  With 
accurate foreknowledge of probabilities, risks could be traded under 
competitive conditions.  For example, a ten percent chance of making a 
$1000 oil discovery is worth $100.  In contrast, “uncertainty” referred to 
future events whose probabilities could not be known.  In such cases, 
investors would demand a premium as compensation for exposure to an 
adverse unpredictable outcome.71
Many of the early Marginalists viewed the stock market with suspicion, 
regarding it as not conforming to the usual laws of supply and demand.  
Certainly, the boom-bust stock price cycles of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century frustrated the application of basic competition theory to 
stock pricing.  Prices appeared to fluctuate wildly, with no apparent relation 
to the value of the underlying firm.
 
72  Under this line of thinking, technical 
analysis flourished, with stock traders hoping to pick winners by searching for 
predictable similarities in past pricing behavior.73
But a more theoretical purist strand in neoclassical economics developed 
the view that, notwithstanding the frenzy with which stocks are often 
purchased and sold, overall pricing tends to reflect fundamental values.  For 
example, Irving Fisher, author of the separation theorem,
 
74 consistently 
argued that stock prices reflected intrinsic values, in which returns to stocks 
operated as an “implied” rate of interest and owners were compensated with 
higher returns in exchange for taking on greater risk.75
 
                                                                                                                          
71.  Id. 
  John Burr Williams 
72.  See, e.g., JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND 
MONEY 156 (1936) (arguing that the stock market operates as a kind of “beauty contest” 
in which shares’ prices were based not on fundamental value, but on each buyer’s 
prediction of what valuation others would place on a firm’s shares). See also JOHN HICKS, 
VALUE AND CAPITAL: AN INQUIRY INTO SOME FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIC 
THEORY (1939); ROBERT RHEA, THE DOW THEORY (1932). 
73.  See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY: HOW FINANCE TRIUMPHED 
OVER INDUSTRY 274–75 (2007). 
74.  See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
75.  IRVING FISHER, THE RATE OF INTEREST: ITS NATURE, DETERMINATION AND RELATION 
TO ECONOMIC PHENOMENA 10 (1907) (speaking of an “implied rate of interest” in stocks 
that reflects the investor’s anticipation of returns).  See also id. at 216 (noting that the 
intrinsic value of stocks is such as to produce a higher rate or return because stocks are 
also accompanied with more risk).  More than two decades later, Fisher returned to the 
same themes in IRVING FISHER, THE THEORY OF INTEREST: AS DETERMINED BY THE 
IMPATIENCE TO SPEND INCOME AND OPPORTUNITY TO INVEST IT 69, 126–27 (1930).  See 
also BENJAMIN GRAHAM & DAVID L. DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS: PRINCIPLES AND 
TECHNIQUE 15–18, 404–11 (1951) (emphasizing a strategy of “value investing” by 
studying fundamentals in search of undervalued stocks). 
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also insisted that the price of shares reflected the intrinsic value that they 
represented—namely, objectively reasonable expectations of future earnings 
and dividends.76  Mathematically, the value of a corporation is the expected 
value of its stream of future earnings.  Building on Williams’ work, University 
of California economist Harry Markowitz then developed the idea that an 
optimal portfolio of stocks consists of stocks of differing risk levels, and 
riskier investments are offset by higher rates of return, notwithstanding higher 
variability.77
The efficient capital market hypothesis was constructed on the 
marginalist theory of perfect competition, where every market participant is a 
price taker, and the price of a stock quickly moves toward an equilibrium that 
tends to equalize its risk-adjusted return to that of other stocks and financial 
instruments.
 
78  The theory developed in stages.  First was the observation that 
returns at the margin will be equalized.  Next was the observation that, to the 
extent the market discounts all information about a stock into its price, the 
current price is always the “correct” one.  Finally, it was observed that even 
high-risk and low-risk stocks should produce the same return in the long run 
because high-risk stocks will be compensated through a stock price that yields 
a higher return.79
From that point the only missing ingredient was informational efficiency, 
or the idea that the market price of a security is a reflection of the information 
that is publicly known about it.  To the extent that information is both 
accurate and relatively quickly disseminated, the market price will tend to 
reflect rational expectations about fundamental value.
  As a result, any randomly selected mixture of stocks should 
perform just as well as any other similarly diversified mixture. 
80
 
                                                                                                                          
76.  JOHN BURR WILLIAMS, THEORY OF INVESTMENT VALUE 54–58 (1938). 
  Already in 1900 
77.  See Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952). 
78.  See Jean-Jacques Laffont & Eric S. Maskin, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Insider Trading 
on the Stock Market, 98 J. POL. ECON. 70, 70–71 (1990) (noting that the efficient capital 
market hypothesis assumes nearly perfect competition and breaks down under oligopoly, 
where prices and the release of information may be strategic—if transaction costs are 
positive or there are serious asymmetries in information then various versions of the 
hypothesis may not apply). 
79.  Markowitz, supra note 77.  
80.  Eugene F. Fama’s doctoral dissertation, often credited with assembling the data and 
proofs that created the modern efficient market hypothesis, was published as Eugene F. 
Fama, The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38 J. BUS. 34, 39 (1965).  On the history of the 
efficient market hypothesis, see MICHAEL C. JENSEN & CLIFFORD W. SMITH, JR., THE 
MODERN THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 2–20 (1984).  See also EUGENE F. FAMA, 
FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCE (1976); SANFORD GROSSMAN, THE INFORMATIONAL ROLE OF 
PRICES (1989); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical 
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Louis Bachelier, a French mathematician, had written a doctoral dissertation 
entitled The Theory of Speculation, arguing that the history of commodity prices 
shows that they are in fact randomly distributed, making it impossible to 
predict future prices from past price histories.81  Beginning in the 1930s, a 
number of studies suggested the same thing for stock prices.82
In his now famous doctoral dissertation, Eugene Fama assembled this 
theory about competition and information dispersion, as well as the empirical 
studies of pricing behavior into what is now known as the efficient capital 
market hypothesis.  This hypothesis generally states that in any market in 
which information flows without restraint, current market prices reflect 
investors’ collective beliefs about the value of the goods that are being traded.  
While the efficient capital market hypothesis can be applied to any market 
that satisfies its conditions, and has frequently been applied to commodities 
markets,
  For example, 
detailed recording of a series of throws of a single die provides information 
that there is a one-in-six chance of getting a five, but no sequence in historical 
throws provides any useful information about predicting a sequence in future 
throws.  As a result, an efficient investor can forget the historical research 
about price movements. 
83
The efficient capital market hypothesis comes in three versions: weak, 
semi-strong, and strong.
 its main impact has been in the analysis of stock market pricing.   
84
                                                                                                                          
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383, 388 (1970) (proposing the “strong,” “semi-strong” and “weak” 
forms of the efficient market hypothesis); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 
J. FIN. 1575, 1575 (1991).    
  The weak form states that current prices reflect all 
of the information contained from observations of previous investment 
prices.  As a result, historical pricing information is not useful for predicting 
future prices; thus so-called “technical” analysis from price movements is 
useless as a predictor of future prices.  Under the semi-strong form, current 
prices reflect all public information, including not only technical information 
81.  LOUIS BACHELIER, THE THEORY OF SPECULATION (Mark Davis & Alison Etheridge 
trans., Princeton Univ. Press 2006) (1900). 
82.  See Holbrook Working, A Random-Difference Series for Use in the Analysis of Time Series, 29 J. 
AM. STAT. ASS’N 11, 11–12 (1934) (noting that stock prices appeared to move randomly, 
making technical forecasting impossible); Alfred Cowles 3rd, Can Stock Market Forecasters 
Forecast?, 1 ECONOMETRICA 309, 323–24 (1933) (concluding that professional stock 
pickers did not do better than a random walk in selecting stocks for their clients); Alfred 
Cowles 3rd & Herbert E. Jones, Some A Posteriori Probabilities in Stock Market Action, 5 
ECONOMETRICA 280 (1937); M.G. Kendall & A. Bradford Hill, The Analysis of Economic-
Time-Series-Part I: Prices, 116 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y 11 (1953). 
83.  See, e.g., Roger W. Gray & David J.S. Rutledge, The Economics of Commodity Futures Markets: 
A Survey, 39 REV. MARKETING AGRIC. ECON. 57 (1971).  
84.  See Fama, supra note 80, at 388 and accompanying text. 
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but also information pertaining to “fundamentals,” which includes all 
information about the performance and prospects of a firm.  These 
“fundamentals” include a firm’s assets and liabilities, price-to-equity ratio, and 
other important financial ratios.  Information discussed in the newspaper has 
already been reflected in the market price, and trading on that information is 
of no use.  Further, studying a firm’s fundamentals in order to identify under- 
or over-valued stocks is pointless; thus neither technical analysis nor 
fundamental analysis will help predict a stock’s future price.  Finally, the 
strong form enhances the previous form in that even private information is 
reflected in the stock price.  As a result, even information from insider trading 
will be included.85
Both the strong and the semi-strong versions of the efficient capital 
market hypothesis have strong policy implications for corporate disclosure 
and finance.  Principally, they mitigate strongly against hard regulation but in 
favor of disclosure of information.
 
86  With respect to information, mandatory 
disclosure is more important for smaller companies than for larger publicly 
traded companies that are likely to be followed by a large number of 
analysts.87  In general, the amount of regulation of information that should be 
supplied varies inversely with the amount of information available and 
disseminated by private analysts.88
 
  Finally, the type of financing a firm 
chooses and its production or expansion decisions will always be reflected in 
the market price, making command-and-control regulation largely 
unnecessary. 
CONCLUSION: THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND AWARENESS 
 
Nearly every interesting assertion in Berle and Means’ Modern Corporation 
 
                                                                                                                          
85.  See STEPHEN A. ROSS ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 352–57 (7th ed. 2005). 
86.  See Charles R. Plott, Markets as Information Gathering Tools, 67 S. ECON. J. 2, 9–10 (2000). 
The Supreme Court approved what amounted to the semi-strong form of the efficient 
capital market hypothesis in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42, 246–47 (1988).  It 
had been applied previously in many circuits.  See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th 
Cir. 1975).  On the Basic litigation and the reaction to it, see JOEL SELIGMAN, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 658–65 (Aspen Publishers 3d ed. 2003).  On the 
history of the fraud-on-the-market hypothesis in litigation prior to Basic, see Barbara 
Black, The Strange Case of Fraud on the Market: A Label in Search of a Theory, 52 ALB. L. REV. 
923 (1987). 
87.  See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and 
Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 810–11 (1985). 
88.  Id. at 812. 
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has been disputed, including separation of ownership and control.  Stigler and 
Friedland disputed the hypothesis that ownership and control were 
substantially separated in any functional sense.89  Other scholars doubt Berle 
and Means’ suggestion that stock ownership prior to the 1930s was as dilute 
as they believed.90  These scholars also believed that even in widely-held 
corporations, organized blocks of stockholders preserve effective ownership 
control.91  Other literature disagrees strongly and gives evidence that, at least 
as a factual matter, Berle and Means were correct.  In many large corporations 
stock ownership is in fact diffuse, and managers are not effectively controlled 
by owners.92  Regardless, the separation of ownership and control that Berle 
and Means claimed to identify would be a crucial component in the formation 
of corporate governance and finance theory for the balance of the twentieth 
century.93
Of course, in an important sense, the historical fact of separation of 
ownership and control is but a detail.  Much more important are the 
conclusions to be drawn.  For Berle and Means and other Institutionalists, 
Legal Realists, and more recent critics such as Ralph Nader,
 
94
 
                                                                                                                          
89.  Stigler & Friedland, supra note 7, at 244. 
 the result was 
corporate autocracy and waste.  For the Neoclassicists, by contrast, the result 
was an essential prerequisite to theory.  By the 1970s, Marginalism and price 
90.  See, e.g., Leslie Hannah, The ‘Divorce’ of Ownership from Control from 1900 Onwards: Re-
calibrating Imagined Global Trends, 49 BUS. HIST. 404 (2007).  Contra EDWARD S. HERMAN, 
CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER: A TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND STUDY 
(1981) (finding widespread dispersion of stockholders already by 1900). 
91.  Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 
1377 (2009) (noting that 96% of a sample of publicly traded firms in the United States 
have blockholders that, on average, own 39% of the shares in their corporation). 
92.  See Brian Cheffins & Steven Bank, Is Berle and Means Really a Myth? (Eur. Corp. Gov’t Inst., 
Working Paper No. 121/2009, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1352605.  The 
empirical work leading up to The Modern Corporation was developed in Gardiner C. Means, 
The Separation of Ownership and Control in American Industry, 46 Q.J. ECON. 68 (1931). See also 
R.A. Gordon, Stockholdings of Officers and Directors in American Industrial Corporations, 50 Q.J. 
ECON. 622 (1936) (essentially confirming Berle and Means’ factual hypothesis); R.A. 
Gordon, Ownership by Management and Control Groups in the Large Corporation, 52 Q.J. ECON. 
367 (1938); Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power: Hearing Before the Temp. Nat’l Econ. 
Comm. Cong. of the U.S., 76th Cong., Monograph No. 29 (1940) (statement of Raymond 
Goldsmith, et al. in “The Distribution of Ownership in the 200 Largest Non-Financial 
Corporations”).   
93.  JAMES P. HAWLEY & ANDREW T. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY CAPITALISM:  HOW 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS CAN MAKE CORPORATE AMERICA MORE DEMOCRATIC 
(2000). 
94.  See Ralph Nader, The Concord Principles: An Agenda for a New Initiatory Democracy 
(Feb. 1, 1992), available at http://www.co-intelligence.org/CIPol_ConcordPrinciples.html. 
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theory came to define every aspect of the business firm, including its 
behavior, its market structure, and its financial structure.  Stock ownership 
became no more than a detail and, even when it was relevant, did no more 
than explain deviations from the norm. 
Therefore, the result of marginalist finance theory, particularly the 
efficient capital market hypothesis, was to take Berle and Means’ separation of 
corporate ownership and control one step further, to the separation of 
ownership and awareness.  In an efficient capital market, investors can 
maximize their returns without knowing the products that a firm produces, 
the markets in which it operates, the makeup of its board of directors, or even 
the name of its CEO.  A random selection of stocks produces the same 
return as the most careful research.95
 
  Indeed, under the strong version of the 
efficient capital market hypothesis, the actions of managers become irrelevant 
because these actions will immediately be reflected in the stock price.  The 
effect of these theories on the shareholder was significant.  Shareholders of 
publicly traded corporations could invest with indifference and 
indiscrimination—a massive shift away from the nineteenth century vision of 
the corporation as a device to facilitate investment predominately by groups 
of active owner-operators who sought to limit their liability. 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
95.  See DONALD R. STABILE, FORERUNNERS OF MODERN FINANCIAL ECONOMICS: A RANDOM 
WALK IN THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 90–95 (2005). 
